Things get funky when Richard Brown and Pete Mandik tackle this funky question about consciousness and its contents: In order to account for consciousness in terms of representational content, how FUNKY does the content need to be? Along the way we discuss the representation of inexistents and whether mathematical structuralism can shed light on the conceivability of undetectable qualia inversions. Is there any real difference (as opposed to a merely notational difference) between the square root of negative one and the negative square root of negative one? If so, what would that tell us about the question of whether intersubjectively undetectable qualia inversions are conceivable? Anything?
- Videos from the "Higher-Order Theories and Mental Qualities" conference in honor of David Rosenthal
- Alex Byrne "Rosenthal on Mental Qualities"
- Richard Brown "Two Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness"
- Austen Clark "Qualitative Character and Conceivable Inversions"
- Leibniz’s Law (Identity of Indiscernibles) @wikipedia